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1 Introduction
Reinforcement is one of the most basic processes underlying human learning. Accord-
ingly, it has received widespread attention in psychology, going back to Thorndike’s
(1911) “law of effect,” neuroscience (e.g. Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Schönberg et al.,
2007), and computer science (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Within microeconomics and
game theory, it has been frequently studied as a boundedly-rational behavioral rule (see,
e.g. Börgers and Sarin, 1997; Erev and Roth, 1998), as have been other rules, e.g. imi-
tation or myopic best reply (Weibull, 1995; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998). The simplest
version of reinforcement learning can be viewed as a heuristic which takes past experi-
ences into account for the choice of upcoming actions and prescribes a shift from actions
linked to negative experiences to actions associated with positive rewards: that is, “win-
stay, lose-shift.” This heuristic induces a bias towards past-high-reward actions which
can conflict with rational behavior (outcome bias; Baron and Hershey, 1988; Dillon and
Tinsley, 2008).
Evidence from neuroscience shows that reinforcement-based decisions occur extremely
fast in the human brain (Schultz, 1998; Holroyd and Coles, 2002). Indeed, reinforcement
is a textbook example of an automatic process, as conceived in dual-process theories
from psychology (see, e.g., Kahneman, 2003; Strack and Deutsch, 2004; Alós-Ferrer and
Strack, 2014). Those theories define automatic (or intuitive) processes as immediate,
fast, unconscious, and efficient in the sense of requiring few cognitive resources. For
instance, these processes capture impulsive reactions and behavior along the lines of
stimulus-response schemes. The dual-process approach postulates that human decisions
are mainly influenced by automatic processes and so-called controlled (or deliberative)
processes. The latter are seen as slow, consuming cognitive resources, not instigated im-
mediately, and reflected upon consciously. Explicit maximization of expected rewards,
if conceptualized as a process, would exhibit many if not all of those characteristics.
The relevance of reinforcement for economic decision making was illustrated by Char-
ness and Levin (2005) in a binary-choice, belief-updating task where mistakes (deviations
from optimization under correct Bayesian updating) could be traced to a reinforcement
heuristic. In essentially the same paradigm, Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer (2014) found
evidence of the conflict between reinforcement and rational optimization in the form of
response time asymmetries as predicted by an explicit dual-process model. Recent psy-
chophysiological work (Achtziger et al., 2015) found direct evidence of neural correlates
of reinforcement in this paradigm and studied their relation to economic incentives. Fur-
ther studies relying on this paradigm have examined the interaction of reinforcement and
decision inertia (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016), the influence of framing on reinforcement de-
cisions (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2017), and the regulation of reinforcement processes through
motivational interventions (Hügelschäfer and Achtziger, 2017).
In this work, we take a further step in the study of reinforcement heuristics in eco-
nomic settings by moving beyond binary-choice tasks and studying the explicit relation
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between reinforcement and myopic payoff maximization in strategic decisions. Hence,
we study reinforcement processes in a more complex setting which results in longer de-
cisions times than, e.g., standard neuropsychological experiments. We concentrate on
two-player, 3 × 3 asymmetric normal form games. In this setting, the microeconomics
literature has devoted a great deal of attention to myopic best reply, a behavioral rule
which maximizes the own payoff assuming the other player will repeat her action, and
which can be assumed to have a more deliberative/controlled nature than reinforcement.
Previous work has analyzed paradigms where, by design, reinforcement and more
deliberative behavior could either conflict or be aligned (e.g. Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer,
2014). In other settings, however, there might be a great degree of overlap between the
prescriptions of reinforcement and those of myopic best reply. In the present work we
specifically explore to what extent reinforcement can act as a shortcut for (apparent)
optimization in strategic situations with explicit feedback. Suppose a player’s last action
delivered the best possible payoff. Reinforcement will then prescribe to repeat the choice
(win-stay). By definition, however, that choice is the best reply if the opponent stays put.
Likewise, suppose the last action did not deliver the best possible payoff. Reinforcement
will prescribe to choose a different action (lose-shift). But, again by definition, the cur-
rent choice cannot be the myopic optimum, and hence myopic best reply also prescribes
to shift. In principle, the “shift” prescribed by reinforcement is arbitrary, but if payoffs
are observable (as, e.g., if the payoff table is known), the observable maximum becomes
salient and the shift will often be in its direction, leading to an apparent myopic best
reply. In view of these observations, we postulate that reinforcement processes might
often act as cognitive shortcuts resulting in choices indistinguishable from myopic best
reply.1
If choices coming from reinforcement and those prescribed by myopic best reply
cannot be distinguished, how can this hypothesis be substantiated? There are two
possible avenues. The first relies on response times. As explained above, reinforcement
processes are automatic and can be expected to lead to shorter response times than
alternative processes. In contrast, myopic best reply involves explicit maximization and
can be assumed to be deliberative, hence relatively slow. Hence, if the choices favored
by both processes are actually due to the involvement of reinforcement processes, one
should expect shorter response times (compared to other choices), while if they are due
to explicit maximization, response times should be longer.
The second avenue is bygone payoffs. Suppose a player obtains a payoff which is not
the maximum possible one given the opponent’s strategy. If that maximum payoff is
observable, the deviation with respect to it is a cardinal measure of experienced disap-
pointment. Define experienced regret as the difference between the maximum possible
payoff (that of the best reply) and the actually obtained payoff. By definition, regret is
zero if and only if the player has chosen a best reply, and strictly positive if not (this will
1Indeed, the obvious evolutionary reason for the existence of automatic processes is that in certain
situations they are adapted and support (near-)optimal decisions while saving cognitive costs.
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be directly observable in our experiment). Myopic best reply, considered as a behavioral
rule, prescribes to change strategy whenever a best reply has not been chosen. In con-
trast, reinforcement processes are stimulus-response mappings which take the win-loss
information as an input. The loss information also carries a measurement of stimulus
strength which in turn yields a variation in the responses. Hence, standard formaliza-
tions of reinforcement take the probability of a shift to be increasing in the degree of the
loss, which is just the experienced regret as defined above. That is, reinforcement should
be triggered more often for larger experienced regret. Hence, if observed choices follow
from reinforcement processes, one should observe a dependence on experienced regret.
To study these questions, we conducted an experiment (N = 144) where participants
played 3 × 3 games against other players repeatedly. In order to isolate the decision
processes of interest, in our experiment players had full knowledge of their own payoff
tables, but were not aware of the payoffs of the opponents. In this way, we aimed to
eliminate a number of potential confounds, as e.g. imitation or social preferences. Also,
in this simple design the maximum (bygone) payoff associated with a choice is directly
observable, and regret is simply the difference between the highest payoff associated
with the opponent’s choice and the actually received payoff. To make this even simpler,
each of the different payoff tables used in the experiment contain only three different
numerical payoffs, hence maximum payoffs and regret levels are easily observable.
The experiment was divided in short parts of 13 rounds each, and after each part both
the opponent and the payoff table were changed. This was an explicit design decision in
order to prevent convergence or long-run effects, and rather concentrate on the decision
processes.
Our paper is related to several literature strands. Within the reinforcement learning
literature, we focus on simple stimulus-response behavioral rules of thumb, capturing the
basic idea of a “win-stay, lose-shift” stimulus-response mapping. Of course, the litera-
ture on reinforcement also encompasses more involved models. For instance, the game-
theoretic cumulative proportional reinforcement of Laslier et al. (2001) postulates that
actions are chosen with probabilities proportional to their cumulative payoffs obtained
in the past with that move. Modern reinforcement learning models in computational
neuroscience (see Daw, 2012, for an introduction) often include additional factors, e.g.
through a perseveration parameter capturing the tendency to repeat or avoid recently
chosen actions (e.g., Gershman et al., 2009; Wimmer et al., 2012). Our interest, however,
is on Markov behavioral rules conceived as mappings from information at t (e.g., payoffs
and actions of all players) to behavior at t+ 1 (probabilities of the feasible actions), as
standard in the literature of learning in games (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998). Within
this literature, such behavioral rules include imitation (e.g., Vega-Redondo, 1997; Alós-
Ferrer and Weidenholzer, 2008) and myopic best reply (e.g. Kandori and Rob, 1995;
Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer, 2007). This focus is consequential for the analysis. On
the assumption that behavior follows Markov rules, one can concentrate on the esti-
mation of probabilities of actions given only the relevant information, e.g. realized and
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bygone payoffs and actions in the last period. For instance, under such maintained hy-
potheses, the matching within an experiment is irrelevant, as behavior is assumed to
rely only on the information presented to the player (we will, however, also control for
matching in our analysis).
Our experiment is also related to the literature on multi-armed bandits (Gittins, 1979,
1989), in the sense that players repeatedly choose an action out of three possibilities.
However, contrary to this literature we are not interested in optimal (normative) dynamic
strategies, but rather on the actual (one-shot) decision processes employed by human
beings in our setting. Since players were explicitly told that the opponent was human,
our experiment was not framed in terms of intertemporal optimization or uncovering of
optimal actions. Indeed, in our data, we see little evidence for intertemporal optimization
or learning effects. On the contrary, we argue that, in our context, even what might
be interpreted as one-shot optimization might be actually supported by simpler decision
processes.
A more-closely related literature has examined “decisions from experience,” where
subjects make repeated individual decisions in stochastic frameworks but learn the un-
derlying probabilities by making decisions (as opposed to decisions from description,
where the priors are induced; Hertwig et al., 2004). Although our setting is inter-
personal (subjects play against a human being and not a fixed distribution), insights
from this literature are informative. In particular, Erev and Haruvy (2016, Section
1.1.5) remark that decision inertia plays an important role (recall also Alós-Ferrer et al.,
2016), which in our setting would lead to higher rates of win-stay choices compared to
lose-shift ones. This is indeed found in our data. Erev and Haruvy (2016) also list
“surprise-triggers-change” as one of the main reasons for not repeating the last choice;
that is, the probability of inertia decreases when recent outcomes are surprising. In our
case, a larger experienced regret plays the role of surprise. The mirror image of this
effect is “negative recency,” which is sometimes observed in decisions from experience
and implies higher shift rates after surprising positive outcomes (in our case, no regret),
even though those reinforce the last choice.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the experi-
mental design and procedures. Section 3 presents the results, analyzing both choice data
and response times. Section 4 concludes.
2 Experimental Design and Procedures
We conducted 6 sessions with 24 participants each for a total of 144 subjects (91 female)
at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER). Participants were recruited
via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) from the student population of the University of Cologne
excluding students of psychology. The average age was 22.97 years (median 23, range




o 6,2 4,4 2,6
# 2,6 6,2 4,4
÷ 4,4 2,6 6,2
Regret ∈ {0, 2, 4}
Game 2
∼ • x
o 7,1 4,4 1,7
# 1,7 7,1 4,4
÷ 4,4 1,7 7,1
Regret ∈ {0, 3, 6}
Game 3
∼ • x
o 6,1 5,5 1,6
# 1,6 6,1 5,5
÷ 5,5 1,6 6,1
Regret ∈ {0, 1, 5}
Table 1: The three games used in the experiment.
lasted on average 60 minutes. The average payoff was 12.28 EUR (SD= 0.94) including
a show-up fee of 2.50 EUR.
The experiment involved three different 3× 3 normal form games (see Table 1). The
games had a cyclical structure and the three strategies were neutrally labeled: ◦, #, ÷ for
player 1, and ∼, •, x for the opponent. Each table uses only three different payoffs, and
each outcome is clearly attainable for each action the opponent possibly plays. Hence,
maximum bygone payoffs and regret levels (given the actual opponent’s strategies) are
directly and easily observable.
Each subject played a total of 39 rounds divided into three different parts of 13 rounds
each. In each part, a subject faced a fixed game and played against a fixed partner. The
subject saw a 3×3 payoff table with only her own payoffs. That is, she was not informed
about the payoffs of the other player and hence imitation was not feasible, and social
preferences were not a concern. The subject chose one of the three actions (◦, #, ÷)
in each round. Rematching was done within blocks of four players after 13 rounds and
a new game, i.e. payoff table, was presented. The payoff tables were always reordered
and relabeled in such a way that every player saw herself as player 1. The order of the
labels for the own strategies was counterbalanced among subjects. Subjects were paid
for each decision in all rounds. Alternatively, we could have paid one randomly selected
round; Charness et al. (2016) have shown that relying on one or the other method does
not significantly affect behavior.2
The games were designed to generate different levels of “regret,” defined as the
difference between the maximum possible payoff and payoff earned in the previous round.
The levels ranged from 0 to 6 (see Table 1). By construction, in our games a best
reply always reached the maximum payoff available in the payoff table. This was done
on purpose to avoid alternative definitions of experienced regret and, hence, potential
alternative rules based on reinforcement heuristics.
After each round, the actual play from the previous round was revealed. Subjects
saw their own choice, the opponent’s choice, and their own payoff. This information
remained on-screen while they made their choice for the next round (obviously, there
2However, Azrieli et al. (2018, Appendix C) conclude that in a dynamic setting with feedback (as our
design) paying a randomly selected round is not incentive compatible, because agents have an incentive
to experiment.
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Regret 1 2 3 4 5 6
Number 550 494 552 617 589 588
Frequency (%) 16.22 14.57 16.28 18.20 17.37 17.35
Table 2: Frequency of the different experienced regret levels in lose situations.
was no feedback during the first choice of each part). In addition, the column in the
payoff table which represented the choice of the other player in the previous round was
highlighted.
The translated and original instructions including screenshots from the experiment
can be found in the Supplementary Materials. After completing the 39 rounds of
play, participants answered demographic questions, the Maximization and Regret scale
(Schwartz et al., 2002), the Faith in Intuition scale (Epstein et al., 1996; Alós-Ferrer
and Hügelschäfer, 2012, 2016), and a 15-item Big-Five questionnaire (Lang et al., 2011,
p. 560).3 The results reported below are robust to the inclusion of those measures as
controls, but the measures themselves provided no additional insights.
3 Results
3.1 Classification of the Decision Situations
We are interested in the choices that participants made while seeing the previous round’s
outcomes, and hence we dropped the first round of each part (where no feedback on a
previous decision was possible). For all other decisions, if the participant had achieved
the highest possible payoff in the previous round, we classified the following decision as
a win situation, else as a lose situation. The complete data set consists of 144 × 36 =
5184 observations, of which 1,794 observations (34.61%) were win situations and 3,390
(65.39%) were lose situations. Regret, defined as the difference between the maximum
possible payoff and the realized one, was always 0 in win situations and strictly positive
in lose situations. Table 2 contains the frequency of various levels of regret in lose
situations, which were not significantly different from a uniform distribution (χ2-test,
χ2(5) = 8.359, p = 0.1375).
The “win-stay, lose-shift” version of reinforcement we focus on prescribed staying
with the previously chosen option in win situations and shifting away to another option
in lose situations. However, in win situations staying with the previous action is also
the prescription of myopic best reply in our games, since if a player assumes that the
opponent will not change strategy, repeating the strategy which led to a win is optimal.
Further, mere inertia (repeating the previous action no matter what; see, e.g., Alós-
Ferrer et al., 2016) also leads to the same prescription. That is, in win situations all
three behavioral rules (reinforcement, myopic best reply, and inertia) prescribed to repeat
3The German versions of the three scales were taken from Greifeneder and Betsch (2006), Keller et al.
(2000), and Gerlitz and Schupp (2005), respectively.
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the previous action. There were two possible deviations from this common prescription,
i.e. the choice which would have yielded the medium payoff and the one which would
have yielded the low payoff (if the opponent stayed put).
In lose situations reinforcement prescribed to shift away from the previous choice to
one of the two remaining alternatives. Shifting to the maximum-payoff alternative was
aligned with myopic best reply (BR shifts), but shifting to the remaining alternative
(which could be a medium- or low-payoff one) was not (non-BR shifts). Since BR shifts
just require following the bygone payoff, we focus on a reinforcement rule prescribing
BR shifts. By definition, the prescription of inertia was to stay put with the previously-
chosen alternative.
The strategy of analysis is as follows. At the first level, we take decisions as a re-
sponse to the feedback, i.e. we are interested in (Markov) decision rules as studied in the
literature on learning in games (e.g., Fudenberg and Levine, 1998). For such an anal-
ysis, the origin of the input (feedback) is irrelevant, since one studies the probabilities
of responses conditional on the input. Hence we study subject averages (frequency of
choices and response times conditional on choice and situation) with 144 observations
(one per player) and conduct non-parametric (within) tests. At the second level, we con-
duct a robustness analysis and reanalyze the data at the block level (since matching was
within blocks of four players), creating 36 independent observations for non-parametric
tests. That is, at this level each individual observation averages over all decisions of all
four players in a block. At the third level, we analyze the data as a panel through the
appropriate regression models, controlling for a number of additional factors.
3.2 Choice Data
Figure 1 depicts the average individual choice frequencies conditional on win and lose
situations. In win situations, the decision to “stay” (following reinforcement, myopic
best reply, and inertia) was significantly more frequent than any other alternative. Stay
decisions, with an average individual frequency of 51.57%, where more frequent than
shifts to the medium-payoff (26.35%) or the low-payoff action (22.08%). The differences
are significant according to Wilcoxon-Signed Rank tests4 (stay vs. shift to medium,
z = 6.130, p < 0.0001; stay vs. shift to low, z = 6.615, p < 0.0001). Shifts to the
medium-payoff action were also more frequent than shifts to the low-payoff action, and
the difference in distributions is also significant (z = 2.599, p = 0.0094). Tests at the
block level (N = 36) yielded the same conclusions (WSR tests, stay (50.73%) vs. shift
to medium ( 26.92%), z = 4.550, p < 0.0001; stay vs. shift to low (22.36%), z = 4.643,
p < 0.0001; shift to medium vs. shift to low, z = 2.353, p = 0.0186).
In lose situations, shifts to the myopic best reply were also more frequent than other
choices. The average frequency of shifts aligned with myopic best reply was 42.74%,
compared to 26.41% of non-BR shifts (WSR test, z = 6.295, p < 0.0001) and 30.84% of










































Figure 1: Average individual choice frequencies conditional on Win or Lose situations.
Significance levels refer to Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests, adjusted for multiple compar-
isons. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
stay choices following inertia (WSR test, z = 4.443, p < 0.0001). Non-BR shifts were
less frequent than inertia decisions (WSR test, z = −2.108, p = 0.0350). Testing at the
block level (N = 36) yielded the same conclusions (WSR tests, BR shifts (42.07%) vs.
non-BR shifts (26.40%), z = 4.454, p < 0.0001; BR shifts vs. inertia (31.53%), z = 3.849,
p = 0.0002; non-BR shifts vs. inertia, z = −2.090, p = 0.0367).
Figure A.1 (left-hand side) shows that the main results above are robust when choice
frequencies are analyzed for each game separately. That is, the decision to stay in win
situations, respectively to shift to the myopic best reply in lose situations, was more
frequent than other choices in each of the three games.
Table 3 presents panel probit regressions with random effects at the individual level
and standard errors clustered at the matching block. The independent variable is defined
as 1 if the decision followed the prescription of reinforcement / myopic best reply, that
is, stay in win situations and shift to the best-payoff action in lose situations. The
regressions allow us to control for other variables such as the regret level or learning
effects. In all three models, the dummy Win (for win situations) is highly significant and
positive, implying that participants were more likely to follow the common prescription
of reinforcement and myopic best reply in win situations. That is, win-stay decisions
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Reinforcement decision Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Win 0.2201∗∗∗ 0.3737∗∗∗ 0.3733∗∗∗
(0.0618) (0.0859) (0.0849)




Part 2 Dummy 0.0301
(0.0569)
Part 3 Dummy −0.0323
(0.0581)
Constant −0.2075∗∗∗ −0.3606∗∗∗ −0.2959∗∗∗
(0.0377) (0.0738) (0.0887)
LogLikelihood −3429.1594 −3424.0503 −3421.2967
Wald Test 33.0209∗∗∗ 43.1477∗∗∗ 48.5771∗∗∗
Table 3: Random-effects panel probit regressions for choices. Independent variable takes
value 1 if reinforcement was followed. Standard errors (clustered by 36 matching blocks)
in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
are more likely than lose-shift (to the best reply) even though both follow reinforcement
and myopic best reply. This asymmetry is as it should be expected from inertia, since
a “stay” decision complies with this additional process (Erev and Haruvy, 2016; Alós-
Ferrer et al., 2016).5
Model 2 adds the interaction Lose × Regret, which captures the effect of the regret
level in lose situations (recall that regret is identically zero for win situations). The coef-
ficient is also significantly positive in Models 2 and 3, indicating that being further away
from the maximum payoff resulted in a higher probability of following reinforcement.
Model 3 controls for learning effects, adding a coefficient for normalized round within a
part (rescaled to range from 0 to 1) and individual dummies for each part. None were
significant, indicating no evidence of behavioral change over time. That is, consistent
with our Markov-rules approach, at the aggregate level there is no evidence that the
reliance on reinforcement changed over time. Additional regressions including the per-
sonality questionnaires and demographic factors (Table S.1, Supplementary Materials)
as controls yielded the same qualitative results, while the controls themselves provided
no further insights.
Cameron et al. (2008) remarked that a small number of clusters can lead to over-
rejection of standard asymptotic tests and recommending bootstrapping the standard
errors. According to their simulations group sizes of 30 already showed a rejection rate
close to the intended 5% level. Hence, as a further robustness test, we ran a regres-
sion bootstrapping the standard errors with 100 repetitions (Table S.2, Supplementary
Materials), which yielded the same conclusions.
5This is also confirmed by WSR tests comparing win-stay rates (average 51.57%) and the rate of
shifts to the best reply in lose situations (average 42.74%), which are significant both at the individual
(z = 3.275, p = 0.0011) and the block level (z = 3.119, p = 0.0018).
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In summary, the regressions indicate that “win-stay” in win situations were compar-
atively more likely than shifting to the myopically best option in lose situations, but that
the “lose-shift” choice was more likely with higher regret. Note that the latter result
cannot be explained by a behavioral rule based on myopic best reply (which should be
impervious to regret), but is consistent with a general reinforcement process for which
the strength of a loss does play a role.
3.3 Cumulative Reinforcement
The behavioral rules we concentrate on rely on information from the most recent pe-
riod of play only. One can of course ask whether alternative reinforcement rules using
information from longer histories can describe the data better. A prominent exam-
ple is cumulative proportional reinforcement (Laslier et al., 2001), which prescribes to
choose the action with the highest cumulative payoff over the whole past. Relying only
on the simple rules of reinforcement and inertia, which only take the previous round
into account, we can account for 3, 406 (65.70%) out of the 5, 184 observations in our
data set. In contrast, only 2, 214 observations (42.71%) agree with cumulative propor-
tional reinforcement, and the majority of those observations are also aligned with simple
reinforcement and inertia. The combination of inertia and cumulative proportional re-
inforcement captures 2, 813 observations (54.26%). Only 487 (9.39%) observations are
consistent with cumulative proportional reinforcement but not with the other two rules,
while 1, 080 (20.83%) are compatible with our simple reinforcement rule but not with
the other two rules.
We also ran regressions analogous to Table 3 for cumulative proportional reinforce-
ment (Table S.3, Supplementary Materials). That is, the dependent variable was defined
as a dummy taking the value 1 if and only if the decision was consistent with this rule.
The regression did not yield any significant results for winning or regret levels, but
showed a significantly negative time trend, indicating a lower likelihood of following cu-
mulative proportional reinforcement over time. In conclusion, we view these observations
as indicators that it is reasonable to assume Markov decisions rules in this context.
3.4 Response Times
We computed average individual response times conditional on the different situations
and choices, dropping the first round of each part. Note that not all participants have
response times for each shift or stay, since if for instance a participant never shifted away
in win situations, there will be no observations in the corresponding categories. Hence,
the tests below will in general have different numbers of observations (tests at the block
level, however, always have 36 observations).
Figure 2 depicts the averages of response times for shift and stay decisions, condi-
tional on win or lose situations. The fastest decisions are always those consistent with the














































Figure 2: Average individual response times conditional on choice and situation. Signif-
icance levels refer to Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests, adjusted for multiple comparisons. *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
tions, stay decisions were faster than shifts to the medium-payoff action (average 5.25 s
vs. 6.53 s; WSR test, N = 126, z = −4.342, p < 0.0001) and shifts to the low-payoff
action (average 5.34 s vs. 6.73 s; WSR test, N = 112, z = −4.121, p < 0.0001). Response
times for both kinds of shifts were not significantly different in win situations (shift to
medium, 6.34 s; shift to low, 6.53 s; WSR test, N = 109, z = −0.322, p = 0.7475).
Testing at the block level (N = 36) yields identical conclusions (WSR tests, stay (mean
5.01 s) vs. medium (mean 6.34 s), z = −3.629, p = 0.0006; stay vs. low (mean 6.48 s),
z = −3.912, p = 0.0003; medium vs. low, z = −0.471, p = 0.6374).
The same also holds for lose situations. That is, shifts aligned with myopic best reply
were faster than non-BR shifts (average 5.91 s vs. 6.50 s; WSR test, N = 142, z = −2.988,
p = 0.0084) and stay decisions (average 5.95 s vs. 6.44 s; WSR test, N = 142, z = −2.066,
p = 0.0777). Response times for the latter two were not significantly different in lose
situations (non-BR shifts, 6.55 s; stay decisions, 6.45 s; WSR test, N = 140, z = 0.774,
p = 0.4391). However, tests at the block level (N = 36; adjusted, as always, following
Holm-Bonferroni) were not significant in this case (WSR tests, BR shifts (5.98 s) vs.
non-BR shifts (6.48 s), z = −1.870, p = 0.1231; BR shifts vs. stay (6.06 s), z = −0.314,
p = 0.7534; non-BR shifts vs. stay, z = 1.901, p = 0.1719).
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Figure A.1 (right-hand side) illustrates the response time analysis above for each
game separately. The decision to stay in win situations was faster than other decisions
for all Games. The decision to shift to the myopic best reply in lose situations was faster
than other shifts and stay decisions for Game 3 and faster than stay decisions for Game
1, but the differences were not significant for Game 2.
Table 4 presents panel regressions for log-transformed response times, with random
effects at the individual level and standard errors clustered at the matching block.6 The
analysis confirms that decisions which agree with the prescriptions of reinforcement (and
best reply) are significantly faster than other decisions. To see this for win-stay, we look
at the dummy “Stay” which indicates whether the decision was to repeat the previous
choice or not, i.e. inertia. Its coefficient is highly significant and negative in all models,
indicating that (since the interaction Lose × Stay is included in the models) decisions
to stay after a win, hence to stay with the best response, were made significantly faster.
This is consistent with the interpretation that many such decisions might be the result
of relatively automatic processes.7 For lose-shift, we look at the dummy “BR-Shift”
which captures shifts to the payoff-maximizing option after a lose situation, as in Figure
2 (note that shifting to a best response implies a lose situation). Its coefficient is also
significant and negative in all models, again indicating faster decisions.8
The regressions also allow us to examine additional questions. This first concerns
the difference between win and lose situations. Reinforcement / best-reply decisions
were significantly faster in win situations than in lose situations, as revealed by a linear
combination test (1) at the bottom of Table 4.9 The dummy for lose situations is not
significant, implying that shifts not following the reinforcement prescription did not differ
in response times across win and lose situations.
The second additional observation concerns inertia compared to shifts. All models
include an interaction term for stay decisions in lose situations (Lose × Stay), that is,
for following inertia. Concerning inertia and non-BR shifts, the linear combination test
(2) in Table 4 is only marginally significant, and only in model 3. That is, there is
6Response times are nonnegative and their distribution is strongly right-skewed, while the distribution
of log-transformed response times typically shows a normally-distributed shape (e.g., Fischbacher et al.,
2013). Using Shapiro-Wilk W tests at the individual level, the hypothesis of normality was only rejected
for 19 of the 144 subjects at the 5% level, and there were only 7 cases with significance between 5% and
10%. In contrast, using regular response times, the hypothesis of normality is rejected in 113 cases at
the 5% level, and in 11 further cases at the 10% level.
7Some of the non-stay, slower decisions might be the result of more complex decision rules, as e.g.
best-responding to a predicted best response.
8The omitted category are (non-BR) shifts after a win. Since the non-parametric analysis did not
find significant differences between shifts to medium and low-payoff actions, we do not distinguish them
further. An additional regression including a dummy for shifts to the medium-payoff action in win situ-
ations (Table S.4, Supplementary Materials) yields the same conclusions, with the additional coefficient
not being significantly different from 0.
9This difference cannot be explained through pure best-reply behavior, since best reply only depends
on the opponent’s previous choice and not on whether there was a previous win or loss. Reinforcement
yields prescriptions conditional on the situation (win-stay, lose-shift) and could hence account for such
difference. Alternatively, one could argue that, for unmodeled reasons, some best-reply decisions (e.g.
win-stay) are less cognitively demanding than others.
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ln(response time) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Stay −0.2753∗∗∗ −0.2752∗∗∗ −0.2912∗∗∗
(0.0412) (0.0412) (0.0411)
Lose 0.0086 0.0037 −0.0039
(0.0366) (0.0421) (0.0424)
Lose × Stay 0.2202∗∗∗ 0.2205∗∗∗ 0.2233∗∗∗
(0.0491) (0.0487) (0.0476)
BR-Shift −0.0633∗∗ −0.0634∗∗ −0.0680∗∗
(0.0321) (0.0322) (0.0313)




Part 2 Dummy −0.0790∗
(0.0409)
Part 3 Dummy 0.0224
(0.0503)
Constant 1.6494∗∗∗ 1.6494∗∗∗ 1.8643∗∗∗
(0.0440) (0.0441) (0.0537)
R2 0.0256 0.0256 0.0555
Wald Test 105.5638∗∗∗ 111.5129∗∗∗ 298.8777∗∗∗
Linear Combination Tests:
(1) Lose + BR-Shift vs. Stay 0.2205∗∗∗ 0.2155∗∗∗ 0.2192∗∗∗
(0.0292) (0.0391) (0.0414)
(2) Stay + Lose × Stay −0.0551 −0.0547 −0.0678∗
(0.0410) (0.0404) (0.0384)
(3) BR-Shift vs. Stay + Lose × Stay −0.0082 −0.0087 −0.0002
(0.0286) (0.0277) (0.0270)
Table 4: Panel regressions for log-transformed response times. Standard errors (clustered
by 36 matching blocks) in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
only weak evidence that inertia decisions might be faster than non-BR shifts in lose
situations. Concerning inertia and BR shifts, however, the linear combination test (3)
comparing BR-shift decisions with stay decisions in lose situations was not significant,
in contrast with the non-parametric results.
Models 2 and 3 also add the interaction with the regret level (in lose situations, as
in win situations there is no regret), which is not significant, implying that the level
of regret experienced did not affect the response time. This is not at odds with our
previous finding that higher regret levels induce more reinforcement, because the BR-
Shift coefficient already captures the faster response times in lose situations. Model 3
controls for learning effects as in the regression on choice data. As standard in choice
experiments, participants became faster as their familiarity with the interface and the
situation increased, as indicated by a significantly negative coefficient for Normalized
Round. Participants also became faster after the first part (although the effect is only
weakly significant), but there was no improvement of response times in the third part
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compared to the first. Additional regressions including questionnaires and demographics
(Table S.5, Supplementary Materials) as controls yielded the same qualitative results.
Further, an additional regression bootstrapping the standard errors with 100 repetitions
(Table S.6, Supplementary Materials) yielded the same conclusions.
4 Discussion
In our experiment, we examined a behavioral rule based on the simplest reinforcement
principle, “win-stay, lose-shift,” as a possible cognitive short-cut for myopic best reply.
After a previous win, the rule prescribes to repeat the previous choice. After a previous
lose situation, the rule prescribes to shift away from it, and available information allows
to focus on the specific shift favored by myopic best reply. Reinforcement processes
are known to be automatic and associated with short response times, while myopic
best reply, which involves explicit maximization, should be a more deliberative, slower
process.
In win situations, win-stay was a strong driver of behavior. Such decisions occurred
more often and faster than other actions (results confirmed by non-parametric tests
both at the individual and block level and by panel regressions). Choice data alone
could be justified by either reliance on an automatic, impulsive reinforcement process
or a more cognitive, deliberative explicit maximization. However, win-stay decisions
were the fastest decisions observed in our experiment, indicating that a more automatic
process was at work compared to slower decisions. This leads to the interpretation that
stay responses, even though they correspond to myopic bet response, most likely often
followed a more automatic process.
In lose situations, shift rates (to the best reply) were sensitive to the magnitude of
experienced regret, in agreement with reinforcement learning but in contrast to myopic
best reply, which would predict the best-reply rates to be independent from the cardinal
difference between experienced and maximum possible payoffs.10 Also, shifts to the
myopic best reply were more frequent and faster than other choices, confirming the
general interpretation of a more automatic underlying process, although response-time
evidence was less strong than in the case of win situations.
Regression results on response times suggest that stay decisions (consistent with in-
ertia) might actually be as fast as choices following reinforcement or best reply, in agree-
ment with evidence on inertia as an additional, automatic process (Alós-Ferrer et al.,
2016). This also agrees with the observation that, in lose situations, stay decisions oc-
curred more often than shifts which did not follow the maximum payoff. However, shifts
to the myopic best reply were more frequent with higher regret, an effect incompatible
with a pure best-reply interpretation, but perfectly aligned with general reinforcement
processes in which the strength of the loss does play a role.
10In this setting, reinforcement could be seen as a gradual, payoff-dependent version of best reply,
giving rise to behavior in line with quantal response models (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995).
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Our experiment goes beyond previous paradigms on win-stay, lose-shift rules (which
have typically employed binary-choice settings) and shows evidence on the relevance
of simple reinforcement processes in strategic settings. The evidence can and should be
seen as a general caveat, in the sense that evidence in favor of myopic best reply in games
might often be confounded with the workings of reinforcement, the basic building block
of human learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998; Daw and Tobler, 2014; Achtziger et al.,
2015). In this and other cases of overlapping behavioral rules, the analysis of response
times might provide valuable evidence.
16
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Figure A.1: Average individual choice frequencies and response times conditional on
choice and situation. Significance levels refer to Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests, adjusted
for multiple comparisons. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Alós-Ferrer, C., Hügelschäfer, S., and Li, J. (2016). Inertia and Decision Making. Fron-
tiers in Psychology, 7 (169):1–9.
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